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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES 
I. Did the trial court properly conclude that the out-of-court statement 
lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and guarantees of trustworthiness? 
Standard of Review: The decision to admit or exclude hearsay presents a 
mixed question with the trial court afforded considerable discretion in making its 
evidentiary rulings. State v. Webster. 2001 UT App 238, f9, 32 P.3d 976; State v. 
Workman. 2005 UT 66, f 10, — P.3d —. 
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in not allowing plaintiffs 
untimely designation of one of her expert witnesses? 
Standard of Review: A trial court is afforded considerable discretion in 
managing its cases and making decisions to admit or exclude evidence. Boice v. Marble, 
1999UT71,f7,982P.2d565. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 804(b)(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, 
if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) 
the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general 
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the 
statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception 
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the 
trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, . 
the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the 
name and address of the declarant. Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(5) (1992) (now Utah R. Evid. 
807 (2004)). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment to defendant Dr. 
Chichester on the grounds that plaintiff could offer no admissible evidence to prove a 
breach of the standard of care. The claims in this case arise against multiple defendants 
for negligence associated with a pap smear for Ms. Betty Nichols in 1996. Ms. Nichols 
passed away during the pendency of this matter, and her estate was substituted as 
plaintiff, with her daughter, Kathy Romero, as the estate's representative. 
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Although the standard of care was a central issue to the claim of medical 
negligence, plaintiff elected to proceed with only Ms. Nichols1 treating physicians as 
experts designated to provide testimony as to the standard of care and a breach of the 
standard of care. In preparing the case, plaintiff never attempted to preserve Ms. Nichols1 
testimony, although the case was pending since 1998. Nevertheless, Ms. Nichols1 
testimony was the sole evidence that plaintiff relied on to establish a breach of the 
standard of care. 
Plaintiff attempted to introduce the evidence through testimony of Ms. 
Romero regarding what her mother had told several years prior to the litigation. When 
Ms. Romero was deposed, however, her recollection of the time of the out-of-court 
statement and the context in which it arose was less than clear. Because of the defects 
and lack of evidence surrounding the out-of-court statements, the trial court determined 
the statements lack any indicia of reliability or guarantees of trustworthiness. Because 
plaintiff was not able to meet the high burden set forth in Rule 804(b)(5), the trial court 
excluded the out-of-court statements. Without the out-of-court statements, the trial court 
granted Dr. Chichesterfs motion for summary judgment because plaintiff could not 
establish a breach of the standard of care. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 14, 1998, Plaintiff initiated this action against Dr. Chichester, 
alleging medical negligence against Dr. Chichester and other defendants. (R. at 1-7). The 
trial court, in its last Minute Entry dated February 11, 2005, summarized plaintiffs claims 
against all defendants, stating: "The basis of the plaintiffs Complaint against Dr. 
Chichester is that he failed to obtain from Ms. Nichols in 1997 a follow-up pap smear 
which, according to the plaintiff, would have revealed the cancer from which Ms. Nichols 
ultimately died that had apparently been misread by one of the other co-defendants 
following a 1996 pap smear." (R. at 1798). 
In March, 2000, plaintiff, Betty Nichols, passed away, and her daughter, 
Kathy Romero, was substituted as plaintiff. (R. at 63-71; 133-34). After the estate was 
substituted, the parties conducted additional discovery. During this process, Dr. 
Chichester took Kathy Romero's deposition. During her deposition, Ms. Romero testified 
as follows regarding her recollection of conversations with her mother and the 
conversation's relation to certain events: 
Q: Did you discuss with your mother any treatments she'd 
received from Dr. Chichester in 1992? 
A: In 1992? 
Q: Yes. 
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A: I believe what - 1 believe that was after her hysterectomy. 
I remember her telling me she didn't need to have a pap smear 
anymore, because of the hysterectomy. 
Q: Was this in 1992? 
A: I'm not sure. 
•k ik * 
Q: Did you know that your mother had a pap smear done in 1996? 
A: No. 
Q: No, you didn't know? 
A: I don't recall. 
Q: Okay. Do you know if she had a pap smear done in 1997? 
A: Not that I recall. 
Q: Let me go back and ask you about your mother's comment 
about pap smears not being necessary after her hysterectomy. 
A: Right. 
Q: Was that the only reason she gave you for not having 
another pap smear, that somebody had told her that? 
A: Basically, yes. 
* * * 
[Referring to 1998:] 
Q: What did she tell you about her visit? 
A: She just told me that Jacquelyn, the nurse practitioner, had 
checked her, told her she just thought it was a blood blister. . . 
. and told mom that because she had had a pap smear over a 
year ago, that she probably wouldn't need another one and that 
she thought everything was okay. 
Q: You said that she told you that she probably wouldn't need 
another one? 
A: Because she had just had a pap smear, that she probably 
wouldn't need another one at this time. 
Q: Okay. Did you recommend to your mother that she go 
ahead and get a pap smear? 
A: I did. 
5 
Q: What did your mother say? 
A: She trusted Chichester's opinion, and said she'd give it a 
couple of weeks and see what happened. 
Q: Did she actually she Dr. Chichester in January of 1998? 
A: No. 
(R. at 1771-73) 
On May 5, 2003, Dr. Chichester moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
Plaintiff had not timely designated any expert who could opine regarding the applicable 
standard of care, whether a breach of that standard had occurred, and that any breach was 
the proximate cause of the injuries. (R. at 808-64, 871-73). This Court denied Dr. 
Chichester's motion for summary judgment. (R. at 1301, 1350-51). The Court ruled in 
part from the bench that Dr. Chichester had presented no affirmative evidence in the form 
of expert testimony that the standard of care was not breached. (R. at 1823, pp. 25-28). 
Dr. Chichester next moved to strike Plaintiffs "designation" of Christopher 
Jolles, M.D., as a witness who would render expert testimony. (R. at 1302-04, 1308-46). 
In opposition to Dr. Chichester's motion to strike, Plaintiffs counsel argued that he 
would elicit the requisite testimony from Ms. Nichols' treating physicians, including Dr. 
Chichester, as experts who may opine regarding the standard of care or causation in this 
case. (R. at 1352-1409). With regard to causation, Plaintiff stated that Dr. Christopher 
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Jolles would opine regarding the proximate cause of Ms. Nichols' death and Plaintiffs 
damages. (R. at 1352-1409). 
Although the Court later denied Dr. Chichester's motion to strike Dr. Jolles, 
the Court also ruled that Plaintiffs late designation of William Matviuw, M.D.—an 
expert who Plaintiff claimed would testify regarding the standard of care—was untimely 
and therefore barred. Consequently, Plaintiff was limited to Ms. Nichols' treating 
physicians and Dr. Yao-Shi Fu to establish her prima facie case of medical negligence. 
(R. at 1526-32). 
Because plaintiff failed to timely designate an expert establishing the 
standard of care or a breach of the standard, Dr. Chichester again moved for summary 
judgment. (R. at 1537-39, 1540-1615). In opposition to Dr. Chichesterfs Motion for 
Summary Judgment, plaintiff filed her a Memorandum in Opposition. (R. at 1619-1688). 
In opposing Dr. Chichester's motion, plaintiff did not properly rebut the facts set forth by 
Dr. Chichester (R. at 1690-91) and set forth her own facts (R. at 1622). In so doing, 
plaintiff alleged in paragraph 6 of her opposition memorandum: "Betty Nichols was told 
by Dr. Chichester she did not need annual pap smears because she had a hysterectomy." 
(R. at 1622). In objecting to this fact, Dr. Chichester requested the court to strike 
paragraph 6 and not consider it because it was hearsay. (R. at 1692). 
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The trial court heard oral argument on the motion on September 27, 2004. 
At the hearing, the court expressed concern regarding the question of the admissibility of 
Betty Nichols1 out-of-court statement about what Dr. Chichester had told her. (R. at 
1729). Due to plaintiffs reliance on Ms. Nichols1 treating physicians to establish the 
standard of care and the nature of the testimony provided by these physicians, the court 
concluded plaintiffs entire case hinged on the admissibility of the statement. (R. at 1729) 
Because of the importance of the issue, the trial court requested further briefing from both 
sides on the admissibility of the statement. (1729). Both sides submitted supplemental 
briefs on the issue of whether the statement was admissible. (R. at 1730-1773, 1774-
1783). 
The trial court heard additional oral argument on the issue of the 
admissibility of the statement on February 7, 2005. (R. at 1796, 1824). After oral 
argument, the trial court took the matter under advisement. (R. at 1796, 1824). The trial 
court issued a Memorandum Decision dated February 11, 2005 in which it found the 
statement was inadmissible and granted Dr. Chichester's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(R. at 1797-1804). 
In its analysis of this issue, the trial court first determined the statement was 
being offered for the truth of the matter asserted (i.e. that Dr. Chichester told plaintiff she 
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did not need to return for annual pap smears) and that it was admissible only through the 
residual exception to the hearsay rule. (R. at 1.799-80). The trial court then determined 
the statement lacked the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness because the statement was 
Accordingly,, the trial court concluded the double hearsay statement was inadmissible. (R. 
~
:
^ 1 -82). Without the double hearsay statement, the trial court concluded plaintiff 
~- .i M.II efctabh>.i a biLiK; • he standaul , rcare and giants; ; Menesters Motion 
A final Older was entered on March 22, 2005. (R at. 1803-12). From the 
final Order, plaintiff appealed the trial coi irfs decision. (R, at 1 SI 3 14) 
SUMMAR V OF ARGIJ MEN I 
ri ie claii i is ii i this case are for medical negligence. According!\ • »lcimtiff 
has always had the burden oi demonstrating the applicable standard of care and a breach 
of tb~t standard of care. For tactical reasons, plauii *; i nude the dcusion not to designate 
this standard. Instead, plaintiff designated Ms. Nichols* treating physicians, which 
included Dr. Chichester, on the issue. I he ksiimom < >f the treating physicians, including 
Dr Chichester, was set forth in deposition testimony. 
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Because of plaintiff s decisions, she was left with only a double hearsay 
statement which could not be fixed in time or context to establish a breach of the standard 
of care. Because plaintiff produced no evidence to show the double hearsay had 
sufficient indicia of reliability and to show guarantees of trustworthiness in order to meet 
the heavy burden under the residual exception, the trial court excluded the double hearsay 
statement finding Ms. Romero's testimony less than clear as to context in which the 
alleged statement was made. The trial court's ruling was correct and should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO EXCLUDE THE HEARSAY 
STATEMENT PRESENTS A MIXED QUESTION OF FACT AND 
LAW. 
Although plaintiff is appealing from a grant of summary judgment, plaintiff 
is not appealing whether the decision to grant summary judgment was in error. Rather, 
plaintiff is appealing the trial court's decision to exclude evidence. Because the trial court 
determined the evidence was inadmissible, the trial court went on to grant defendant's 
motion for summary judgment. In other words, plaintiff has not argued that summary 
judgment was still improper if the evidence was properly excluded. As such, the issue on 
appeal is an evidentiary question rather than whether the trial court properly granted 
summary judgment. 
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* ' - - -
 ;
 *i Man- \ . Webster, the standard of review governing whether 
an out oi wourt statement ib admissible implicates both factual and legal conclusions. 
Specifically, ff[t]his determination involves applying the law expressed in the i ule to the 
U I * App 238,1|(> 51 P.3d 976. In Webster, the standard of review was discussed in the 
context of Rule 804(b)(3) for statements against interest. See id. Although the residual • 
exception was aisu aikli<^ew im. issues concerning the a^siducu exception were resolved 
:: !i till: le technica • i lirement of the i i lie ^ "j - hich :stic 
law. See id. at f! 1« \ cbsta, liic vuuit noted the deference given to the trial court's 
u>pK< w\\\iY\ tu" facts regarding the circuinstances under which the out-of-court statement. 
was made to thei i lie. See id. at|''9. 
Coi isistent \\ itl i Webster, the I Ita.li Siipi erne Coi lr t recentl) stated: "Oi m: 
standard of review on the admissibility of hearsay evidence is complex, since the 
determination of admissibilit\ 'often eoniain- a number of rulings, each of which may 
require a different standard o,i rev lew." Mate v. Workman, ^nr . 
.» \ . * [ 
Appellate Review, 12 Utah Bar J. 8, 38 . !t • in Workman, the Utah Supreme Court 
noted three different standards which may apph iv f :eg ;; questions on the determination 
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of admissibility are reviewed for correctness; (2) questions of fact for clear error; and (3) 
the district court's ruling on admissibility for abuse of discretion. See id. 
Interpreting the residual exception under the identical federal rule of 
evidence, the federal circuit courts have held that a trial court's decision to admit or 
exclude evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. 
Kladouris, 964 F.2d 658, 663 (7th Cir. 1992). Importantly, a trial court "is afforded 
'considerable discretion, within the parameters of the Rules of Evidence, in determining 
whether the hearsay statements contain the necessary circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness.'" Id (citation omitted). Based on the considerable discretion afforded to 
the trial court, the Seventh Circuit stated: "[W]e 'will find an abuse in circumstances only 
where the trial court committed a clear and prejudicial error of judgment in determining 
whether a statement met the conditions for the application of the residual exception.'" 
United States v. Hall 165 F.3d 1095, 1110 (7th Cir. 1998). 
Based on the foregoing Utah and federal authorities, this court should reject 
plaintiffs arguments that the issue is a pure question of law. It is clear from the cited 
authorities that the standard of review is a mixed question. Both the Utah and federal 
authorities agree that typically the trial court's decision to admit or deny hearsay under the 
residual exception invokes some measure of discretion by the trial court. Accordingly, 
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statement has sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness, and the trial court's legal 
interpretation of the rule should be reviewed for eon ectness. 
II THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THE OUT-OF-
COURT STATEMENT WAS INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE STATEMENT HAD 
THE REQUISITE GUAR ANTEES OF TRI JSTWORTHINESS 
The out-of-court statement and circumstances surrounding the statement do 
~~* "*~~ ir- the exceptional circumstances contemplated by the residual exception to the 
* ,.m mentnot 
cxn ered b> any of the eiii ime ' • > . • •-- - " : 
following are demonstrated: ^1, the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees ot 
trustworthiness [as compared to the enumerated exceptions]; (2) the statement is offered 
as e\ iclei ice of a n latei ial fact; (3) tl le statei i lent is more pr< >bative than other evidence 
available to the proponent; and ( 1 ) the gei leral pi irpose ' • i 
justice are served by admitting the statement. Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(5); see also 
Workman, 2005 I IT 66 at ^[11. As the I Jtah Supreme Court has indicated; "The residual 
1 iearsa> exceptioi I is to be I lsed i ai el) ai id consti tied sti ictl> M Id. at^j] 2 Ii I Workman, 
the Uuih sunsviv — • •• nfai that "we oi ily allc • \ v tl i s adi i lissioi I of 1 leat say e v idence 
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under the residual exception when the high requirements of rule 804(b)(5) are met." Id.; 
see also State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238,1|26, 32 P.3d 976. 
Although "out-of-court statements are generally inadmissible because they 
are presumed to be unreliable," see United States v. Hall 165 F.3d 1095, 1110 (7th Cir. 
1998), the Utah Rules of Evidence contain 29 separate exceptions to the hearsay rule 
allowing certain statements to be admitted into evidence. See State v. Webster, 2001 UT 
App 238,1f20, 32 P.3d 976. Each of these exceptions exists, however, because the nature 
of the context in which the hearsay statement is made provides some guarantee or indicia 
of trustworthiness. See State v. Allred, 2002 UT App 291, f 22, 55 P.3d 1158 
("Exceptions to the hearsay rule are based on factors that provide assurances of 
testimonial reliability sufficient to dispense with usual means of purging testimony of 
error and falsehood."). Because certain circumstances are inherently trustworthy, the 
Utah Rules of Evidence allow a statement's admission into evidence under the 
enumerated exceptions. 
In addition to the enumerated exceptions, the Rule provides a residual or 
catch-all exception for those statements that do not meet one of the 29 exceptions. The 
residual exception, however, is not meant to be a broad exception, and applies only in rare 
and exceptional circumstances. See Webster, 2001 UT App 238 at [^26; United States v. 
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I i iijillo 136 F 3d 1388. 1395 96 (1 Oth Cii 1998) Ii i. < HI 1 lei K < m is. "the pi upose of this 
residual exception rule is to allow trial judges to admit certain hearsay statements that do 
not fall within any of the specific exceptions, but which have "equivalent circumstantial 
"Accordingly, the party offering the evidence bears a heavy burden of presenting the trial 
coin *.\ it 11 sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to trigger application [of the residual 
exception].;1 l± at 1.396; see also Workman, 2005 1 ) I 66 at f 1.2; Webster, 2001 I IT A pp 
238, nil |26. 
in *A ebster, the Utah Court oi Appeals adopted the factors used by the 
Seventh Ciroiu • determine whether to admit or exclude out-of-court statements under 
tin i. Miiuai c\L-q>iu»h See Webster, 2001 I IT App 238 at f27. Accordingly, in 
should examine, among otliei i actors * I » :he probable motivation of the declarant in 
i naking the statement; (2) the uicumstances under which it was made; and (3) the 
knowledge andquaiiiiv,ahon^ v • thv. »k* ««iMti.. hi. thinning United States v. HalL U'o 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals went on to set forth additional 
considerations from the Seventh Circuit: m[W]e have identified several additional factors 
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that may be considered in determining whether hearsay testimony has sufficient 
'guarantees of trustworthiness1... (1) the character of the declarant for truthfulness and 
honesty and the availability of evidence on the issue; (2) whether the [statement] was 
given voluntarily, under oath, subject to cross examination and a penalty for perjury; (3) 
the extent to which the [declarant's statement] reflects his [or her] personal knowledge; 
(4) whether the [declarant] ever recanted his [statement]; and (5) whether the declarant's 
statement was insufficiently corroborated.'" Id, 
a. Plaintiff Produced No Evidence to Demonstrate the Statement Was 
Trustworthy. 
Plaintiff had the burden of meeting the high standard which governs 
admissibility of hearsay statements under the residual exception. In this case, the trial 
court determined Kathy Romero's statement did not have any indicia of trustworthiness to 
make it admissible. In fact, plaintiff provided the trial court with little on which it could 
have determined that the proffered statement was trustworthy. See, e.g., Trujillo, 136 
F.3d at 1397 (counsel made no showing that the statement was reliable or trustworthy); 
Kim, 595 F.2d at 766 ("the burden is on the proponent to produce evidence of 
trustworthiness"). In opposing Dr. Chichester's Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff 
did not provide an affidavit or any other admissible evidence to meet the heavy burden 
under the residual exception. (R. at 1619-88). Rather, plaintiff argued that it was Dr. 
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Chichester's obligation to elicit further testimony fron i. Kath) R omero to bolster her 
plaintiffs case or that the double hearsay statement is admissible. 
Plaintiff argues the statement occurred following the visits to Dr. Chichester 
w ai.vi huu , ..omero can provide ihat detail att i ial."""" (I 'laintiff "s Bi ief at pp. 
request for supplemental briefing plaintiff did not come forward w ith any evidence 
regarding when the conversation occuru d o» die eont' \ ' "P. which the conversation 
occurred. (R. at 1 730 73). For this reason, t,... iw.;* • • -.- jcternnned the oui-oi ..ourt 
statement lacked si ifficient gi mi ant •* • -.-< t\- ?t 
stated: '"The testimony in Ms. Romero's deposition while reasonably clear on what she 
claims she was told by her mother, is substantially less clear as to when that conversation 
took place and ii i x v 1: tat context "' {l<, ;ii ! S I ) I he trial court continued to note that it 
treatment, made the allegation that her daughter now attributes to her. There is nothing in 
the court record that would be admissible as evidence as to such a statement being made 
tc > I" * Is Nichols tl: u it comes fron l Ms. Nicl lols'" own mouth ' " (R at 1 ) 81) ' 
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For the first time and on appeal, plaintiff indicates that she can provide the 
necessary detail at trial. Plaintiff had two opportunities to come forward with evidence to 
prove the out-of-court statement was admissible. Plaintiff could have filed a sworn 
affidavit in opposing the motion for summary judgment or in conjunction with the 
supplemental briefing. Instead, plaintiff provided the court with nothing. Assuming 
plaintiffs memory was now refreshed as to the time and context of the conversation, 
plaintiff had the obligation to provide that evidence to the trial court. Plaintiffs attempt 
to provide the evidence cannot occur for the first time on appeal. Because plaintiff 
wholly failed to meet her heavy burden, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling 
excluding the evidence. 
b. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs Statement That She Can Now Provide 
Details of the Conversation, Plaintiff Was Questioned Under Oath 
and Testified She Could Not Recall the Details. 
Kathy Romero was questioned and given the opportunity to provide details 
regarding the alleged statement by her mother that Dr. Chichester had told her she did not 
need annual pap smears. When questioned, however, Kathy Romero's statement was less 
than clear, and she stated that she did not know when her mother made the statement. 
Specifically, Kathy Romero testified as follows: 
Q: Did you discuss with your mother any treatments she'd 
received from Dr. Chichester in 1992? 
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A: In 1992? 
Q: Yes. 
A: I believe what - 1 believe that was after her hysterectomy. 
I remember her telling me she didn't need to have a pap smear 
anymore, because of the hysterectomy. 
Q: Was this in 1992? 
A: I'm not sure. 
"k "k * 
Q: Did you know that your mother had a pap smear done in 1996? 
A: No. 
Q: No, you didn't know? 
A: I don't recall. 
Q: Okay. Do you know if she had a pap smear done in 1997? 
A: Not that I recall. 
Q: Let me go back and ask you about your mother's comment 
about pap smears not being necessary after her hysterectomy. 
A: Right. 
Q: Was that the only reason she gave you for not having 
another pap smear, that somebody had told her that? 
A: Basically, yes. 
* * * 
[Referring to 1998:] 
Q: What did she tell you about her visit? 
A: She just told me that Jacquelyn, the nurse practitioner, had 
checked her, told her she just thought it was a blood blister. . . 
. and told mom that because she had had a pap smear over a 
year ago, that she probably wouldn't need another one and that 
she thought everything was okay. 
Q: You said that she told you that she probably wouldn't need 
another one? 
A: Because she had just had a pap smear, that she probably 
wouldn't need another one at this time. 
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Q: Okay. Did you recommend to your mother that she go 
ahead and get a pap smear? 
A: I did. 
Q: What did your mother say? 
A: She trusted Chichesterfs opinion, and said she'd give it a 
couple of weeks and see what happened. 
Q: Did she actually she Dr. Chichester in January of 1998? 
A: No. 
(R. at 1771-73). From the above testimony, it is unclear when the alleged conversation 
between Ms. Romero and her mother occurred. Specifically, Ms. Romero refers to events 
in 1992, 1996 and 1998 and provides testimony that the statement may have been made at 
any of those times. By way of contrast, the Complaint refers to a 1996 office visit when 
Dr. Chichester allegedly told Ms. Nichols she did not need annual pap smears. (R. at 2). 
The allegations of a breach of standard of care is premised on Dr. Chichester's alleged 
failure to tell Ms. Nichols she needed annual pap smears in 1996. 
With respect to the critical 1996 office visit with Dr. Chichester, Ms. 
Romero testified she was not even aware if her mother had a pap smear in 1996. (R. at 
1771). On the other hand, Ms. Romero discussed medical events in 1992 and 1998 when 
her mother may have made the statement. (R. at 1770-73). If the statement was made at 
either of these times, plaintiffs negligence claim against Dr. Chichester fails. As to each 
of the time frames, Ms. Romero was unable to provide any specific recollection of when 
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the statement was made or in what context. Without those details, the out-of-court 
statement is unreliable and properly excluded by the trial court. 
Without any time or context for the statement, the trial court determined the 
statement did not have sufficient reliability or trustworthiness to satisfy the residual 
exception. (R. at 1797-1804). Kathy Romero's inability to fix Betty Nichols' statement to 
a certain date severely undercuts the trustworthiness of the statement. In United States v. 
Hall, the Seventh Circuit determined a witness's inability to recall when a statement was 
made was a factor leading the court to conclude the statement was not trustworthy. See 
Hall 165 F.3d 1095, 1111 (7th Cir. 1998). Specifically, the court noted that only if the 
statement was made before the body was discovered and publicity of the event occurred 
would the declarant have independent knowledge unaffected by other accounts. See id. 
As to additional hearsay statements, the Seventh Circuit again noted the "statements 
cannot be established with any degree of reliability in relation" to a critical date. See id. 
at 1112. 
In contrast, the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Sloan noted that although 
a significant amount of time had passed in between when an event occurred and when 
certain statements were made, the trial court could still identify the time frame in which 
the statements were made. See State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170,1J17, 72 P.3d 138. 
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Because of this fact, the court concluded the statement had some indicia of reliability. In 
certain instances, the ability to fix the statement to a particular date is critical to 
establishing the reliability of the statement. See also Lee v. Peacock, 404 S.E.2d 473, 474 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (statement made well after event was not sufficient connected to 
incident to free from suspicion of afterthought). 
In this case, Ms. Romero was unable to state when her mother told her that 
the doctor had told her that she did not need annual pap smears. With respect to the 
medical negligence claim, the time the out-of-court statement was made is critical in 
establishing a breach of the standard of care. The allegation was the statement was made 
in 1996. Yet, Ms. Romero was unable to verify this in her deposition testimony. Further, 
she provided no additional evidence or sworn testimony to assist the trial court. This 
Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that the statement lacks sufficient reliability 
based on Ms. Romero's less than clear testimony about the time and context of its making. 
c. When the Statement Was Made in Relation to Events at Issue 
Affects the Reliability of the Statement Because of Witness Bias 
and Distorted Recollections. 
In this case, Kathy Romero was unable to testify that her mother had made 
the statement after her examination with Dr. Chichester in 1996, but prior to being 
diagnosed with cancer. If the statement was made after her diagnosis for cancer, the 
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truthfulness of the statement is in doubt because Betty Nichols would then have a motive 
to fabricate the statement. 
Although much of the focus is on the circumstances surrounding the 
declarant who made the statement, "consideration should be given to the factors bearing 
on the reliability of the reporting of the hearsay by the witness." United States v. Bailey, 
581 F.2d 341, 349 (3rd Cir. 1978). In Bailey, the Third Circuit determined statements 
made by an accomplice which implicated his cohort were inadmissible because they were 
made during negotiations for a reduction in charge and were not made under oath. See 
Bailey, 581 F.2d at 351. In its analysis, the Third Circuit reviewed other cases in which 
grand jury testimony was held inadmissible because of the bias of the witness who made 
the hearsay statements. See Bailey, 581 F.2d at 349-50. 
In this case, the same considerations as raised in Bailey affect the 
admissibility of the statements in this case. Specifically, Kathy Romero is not an 
unbiased witness who can be counted on to convey information objectively. More 
importantly, Kathy Romero provided the trial court with no other information about when 
the statement was made or any other context for the statement. On appeal, however, Ms. 
Kathy Romero now states that she could provide the necessary detail at trial. Because 
Kathy Romero was unable to offer these details to the trial court, the reliability of her 
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proffer on appeal regarding the time and context of her mother's statement is not reliable. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling to exclude the double hearsay 
statement. 
d. Ms. Nichols' Statement Was Not Made Under Oath and Affords Dr. 
Chichester No Opportunity for Cross Examination. 
The statement regarding what Dr. Chichester told Ms. Nichols goes to 
whether Dr. Chichester breached the standard of care. Plaintiff seeks to have Ms. 
Romero offer testimony that her mother told her that Dr. Chichester told her mother that 
she did not need annual pap smears. As set forth in Webster, "whether the [statement] 
was given voluntarily, under oath, subject to cross examination and a penalty for 
perjury"is an important factor in determining the reliability. See Webster, 2001 UT App 
238atf27. 
For example, the importance of being able to cross examine the person 
making the statement is highlighted by this case. First, Dr. Chichester was not Ms. 
Nichols' regular physician. In fact, Ms. Nichols saw other physicians from 1992 through 
1998. Ms. Romero has not indicated she can offer any additional testimony regarding 
what exactly was discussed between Dr. Chichester and Ms. Nichols. All Ms. Romero is 
prepared to testify to is the statement that Dr. Chichester told her mother that she did not 
need annual pap smears. Any qualifications or additional discussions that may have 
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occurred in conjunction with the alleged statement are not available. In short, Ms. 
Romero is prepared only to offer testimony favorable to her claims. As to the context and 
other discussions between Dr. Chichester and Ms. Nichols, she will not be able to testify. 
In fact, Ms. Romero stated under oath she did not know that her mother had a pap smear 
in 1996. (R. at 1771). 
The lack of information regarding the context in which the statement was 
made calls into question the reliability of the bare statement itself where the declarant is 
unavailable to be cross examined as to the circumstances that accompanied the statement. 
For this reason, the Utah Court of Appeals noted the importance of having the statement 
be made under oath with the declarant available for cross examination. See Webster, 
2001 UT App 238 at ^27. Because Ms. Nichols did not make the statement under oath 
and Dr. Chichester had no opportunity to cross examine the declarant, the statement lacks 
the indicia of reliability or trustworthiness needed to admit the statement into evidence. 
Related to this, the statement by Ms. Nichols does not reflect her personal 
knowledge about whether or not she needed annual pap smears. Rather, the statement is 
Ms. Nichols* understanding of what Dr. Chichester told her in 1996. In this respect, the 
circumstances and context in which the statement is made is important. It is entirely 
possible that Ms. Nichols misunderstood what Dr. Chichester told her. Because the 
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statement was not made under oath or with the opportunity for cross examination, the trial 
court properly excluded the hearsay statement. 
Because plaintiff produced no evidence to show the double hearsay is 
reliable and trustworthy, the trial court properly excluded the evidence. The residual 
hearsay exception is used only in rare and exceptional circumstances where the proponent 
of the statement can meet the heavy burden set forth in the rule. The plaintiff has not met 
her burden in this case. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED PLAINTIFF'S 
UNTIMELY DESIGNATION OF HER EXPERT WITNESS. 
It is well settled that "[w]hether a trial court has erred in granting or 
denying a motion to designation a substitute expert is a legal question, which we review 
for correctness; however, we afford a trial court very broad discretion in ruling on such a 
motion." Boice v. Marble. 1999 UT 71, Tf7, 982 P.2d 565. On appeal, the Utah Supreme 
Court has emphasized the broad discretion to be given to trial courts, holding: "[t]his 
court will overturn a trial court ruling excluding a proffered witness if the appellant 
demonstrates that the trial court has overreached the broad discretion granted it and 
thereby affected the appellant's substantial rights." Gerbich v. Numed Inc., 1999 UT 37, 
f 16, 977 P.2d 1205: see also Arnold v. Curtis. 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1993) (holding 
that trial court did not "abuse its discretion in refusing" to allow expert witness to present 
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affidavit in opposition to motion for summary judgment where expert was not timely 
designated during discovery). 
On this issue, plaintiffs argument that she should have been allowed to 
designate an expert in an untimely fashion is premised on her claim that Dr. Chichester's 
"prosecution of his defense," "stonewalling," refusal to "admit the obvious standard of 
care," and refusal to disclose his expert's opinions caused her to designate her expert 
untimely. (Plaintiffs Brief at pp. 18-19). Dr. Chichester, however, did nothing to prevent 
plaintiff from designating her expert witness, Dr. Matviuw, in a timely manner. Plaintiff 
was at all times aware of the nature of her claim and the necessity of establishing the 
standard of care and a breach of the standard. The trial court afforded plaintiff several 
opportunities to designate experts on these issues. Assuming each of the tactics which 
plaintiff accuses Dr. Chichester of perpetrating was true, nothing Dr. Chichester could 
have done prevented plaintiff from timely designating an expert witness on the central 
issue in the case. 
More importantly, plaintiff has not demonstrated the trial court overreached 
in its decision to deny the untimely designation. Plaintiff concedes the designation was 
not in time. Plaintiff merely argues that no prejudice would occur given the untimely 
designation. This is not the standard. Trial courts have considerable discretion in 
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managing their dockets. See Gerbich v. Numed Inc.. 1999 UT 37, %\6, 977 P.2d 1205; 
see also Arnold v. Curtis. 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1993). The trial court did not abuse 
its discretion when it did not allow plaintiff to designate a standard of care expert after the 
expert designation cut off. Because plaintiff can demonstrate no abuse of discretion, the 
trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing facts and authorities, Dr. Chichester requests this 
Court affirm the trial court's rulings in this case excluding the double hearsay statement 
from evidence in the case and excluding plaintiffs untimely designation of an expert on 
the standard of care. The trial court's grant of Summary Judgment on plaintiffs claims 
should be affirmed. 
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